sought to impose or, as they saw it, "restore" the hijab on women in Gaza who were not wearing any form of headcovering?mainly educated, urban and petit bourgeois women. The Mujama' endowed the hijab with new meanings of piety and political affiliation. Women affiliated with the movement started to wear long, plain, tailored overcoats, known as shari'a dress, which have no real precedents in indigenous Palestinian dress. Supposed to represent a return to a more authentic Islamic tradition, it is in fact an "invented tradition" in both form and meaning.1 Here the hijab is fundamentally an instrument of oppression, a direct disciplin? ing of women's bodies for political ends. The form itself is directly connected to a reactionary ideology about women's, role in society and a movement that seeks to implement this ideology.
Inventing Tradition
While shari'a dress proliferated in Gaza in the 1980s, pressure to wear it remained site-specific?for example, at the work? place, within religious families or among students at the Islamic University campus. Shari'a dress and the ideologization of the hijab created a new awareness about the differences in the way women dressed, but social space contin? ued to exist for women not to wear any form of hijab. Only during the intifada was this social pressure transformed into an active campaign to impose the hijab on all women. By December 1988, one year after the intifada erupted, it was almost impossible for women to walk around Gaza without wearing some form of headcover. No one really knows how many active supporters the Mujama* has in Gaza. Secularists maintain that were a headcount possible, people would be shocked by how few their numbers are. What is evident to all is the extent to which the Mujama*, through a mixture of consent and coercion, has established a kind of cultural dominance over Gaza. Its power falls short of total hegemony: thus far it has succeeded only in putting secular culture on the defensive without generating political legitimacy for itself. As one Gazan put it: "Their main activities in Gaza are to keep demonstrators away from mosques and to make sure women are covering their heads."
The lack of initial widespread political support for the Mujama* is due to its poor record in fighting the occupation. Although foreign press reports have been full of simplistic assertions about the "Islamic nature" of the intifada in Gaza, it was the nationalist groups (including the Islamic Jihad) who were at the forefront of mobilizing the population in the first months of the uprising. In this appendix we would like to raise the issue which has been at the center of many heated debates ... The issue of women and their role. Woman as we perceive her, besides being a mother, daughter, sister or wife, is an effective human being and full citizen with all rights and responsibilities ... We specify the following points: 1) We are against excessive vanity in personal dress and use of cosmetics during these times. This is applied to the same degree for men and women. 2) We believe that any dispute outside the purview of the occupa? tion and its various offices should be resolved and settled in a democratic way with any suggestions offered in the course of normal constructive discussion or advice. 3) We should value highly the role women have played in our society during these times in achieving our national goals and confronting the occupation and they should not be punished without cause. 4) The phenomenon of harassing women contradicts the traditions and norms of our society as well as our accepted attitudes about women. At the same time it denigrates the patriotism and human? ity of each female citizen. 5) Nobody has the right to accost women and girls in the street on the basis of their dress or the absence of a headscarf. 6) The Unified National Leadership will chase these hooligans and Middle East Report ? May-August 1990 will stop such immature and unpatriotic actions, especially when it is found that many such hooligans consistently engage in their own suspicious activities.
Soon after, graffiti appeared on walls in Gaza proclaiming that "those caught throwing stones at women will be treated as collaborators" and that "women have a great role in the intifada and we must respect them." Leaflet #43 was followed by a statement from the Higher Women's Council, a forum for the four women's committees, which also blamed the Israeli authorities and collaborators for the attacks on women.
The specific incident in Gaza brought to bear both "tradi? tional" and intifada mechanisms of conflict resolution. Due to the lack of an independent judiciary or police force, most internal disputes in Gaza have been handled through a form of sulha ( Although the UNLU's statement was important in stop? ping verbal and physical attacks on women by young men, it was incapable of reversing the overall effect of the campaign.
Many women questioned why it had taken so long for the Unified Leadership to take a stand and why the Higher Women's Council did not act until after bayon #43 was issued. "When the bayon [#43] came out, I wasn't happy," said a woman in Beach Camp. "I was angry because it was so late. If they had done it months ago we wouldn't be where we are now ... Once you put the hijab on, it's very difficult to take it off." Indeed, because the Unified Leadership took so long to act, some women believed that there was tacit support for it. "I remember some women in the committee saying that they wore it [the hijab] because the UNLU didn't condemn it so therefore they must be for it," explained another woman from Beach Camp. 
Why did the Unified

